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ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiffs' Argument that Defendant had Actual Notice of
this Lawsuit Prior to Entry of Judgment was not Raised in
the Trial Court Proceedings and may not be Raised for the
First Time on Appeal.
In their Brieff Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Romero had

actual knowledge of the pendency of this lawsuit before entry of
the default judgment.

Plaintiffs' argument is based on a

handwritten note found in the trial court file, apparently
written by Defendant and addressed to the court clerk.
This allegation that Defendant had actual notice of the
pendency of the lawsuit was not raised by Plaintiffs in the trial
court proceedings. Although the handwritten note was presumably
in the trial court file at the time of Defendant's motion to set
aside

the default judgment, it was not brought to the attention

of Defendant's counsel nor of the court.1
The Affidavit of Lester Romero specifically states that he
learned of the existence of this case for the first time on July
21, 1994. This statement was not contested or disputed in any of
the pleadings filed with the trial court.2

The trial court made

no findings to the contrary, and the trial court's ruling is not
predicated on the existence of actual notice.

The parties and

1

It seems likely that Plaintiffs' counsel would have raised
this issue if he had been aware of it, and that he probably did
not discover the handwritten note until he reviewed the court
file in connection with this appeal.
2

Nor was this statement contested orally, since there was
no oral argument on Defendant's motion to set aside the default
judgment.

the trial court all accepted the accuracy of Mr. Romero's
Affidavit.
If Mr. Romero's statement had been challenged in the trial
court,

he would

have

had

the

opportunity

to

explain

the

discrepancy between his Affidavit and the handwritten note in the
court file.

The trial court would then have been in a position

to make a finding as to the date that Mr. Romero first learned of
the pendency of this case.

Instead, Plaintiffs now present to

the Court of Appeals an unresolved factual issue which has not
been presented to the trial court.
Generally, appellate courts will not consider issues or
facts

raised

for the first time on appeal.

The rule is

summarized as follows in C.J.S.:
When a cause is brought up for appellate review,
a party cannot assume an attitude inconsistent with, or
different from, that taken by him at the trial, and is
restricted to the theory on which the cause was
prosecuted or defended in the court below, although
there is authority to the contrary. This rule has been
said to apply whether the result in the trial court is
in favor of the party or against him.
4 C.J.S. Appeal
and Error § 204 (citations omitted.)
Where a fact is admitted, conceded, or assumed
without objection in the trial court, it cannot be
contested in the appellate court or objected that there
was no evidence on the question, but the theory in the
trial court will be adhered to. 4 C.J.S. Appeal and
Error § 206 (citations omitted.)
The Utah Supreme Court has followed the same rule.

In Ong

International (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (1993),
the

Supreme Court stated:
With limited exceptions, the practice of this
court has been to decline consideration of issues
raised for the first time on appeal. 850 P.2d at 455
-2-
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concern is whether an argument was addressed in the
first instance to the trial court....
'Failure to
raise the point 1" below 1 precludes its consideration
here./
850 P.2d at 455r note 31 (emphasis added,
citations emitted, "i
Under the reason: r:- °
i

.SL^.I^.

^^^.ent- ^onrlict. between

Affidavit and * h: ..indwritten nctr;
should consider +-^:- —
ij(.iiiiiij

mi I in mi mi in ,1

II.

Plaintiffs
Summons

ii|

and

.t

-v •
aiai

; i - t ria* court f' ! P . hut
isuiiifit 11111• •

\— KJ U, X

:< p i a i n -

r Failure

' • 11

i l l III Ill1 i in i in 1 mi I III

Complain

ll

l l i i i i IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

Residence.
The Statement of Facts and the Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief
show that there v=-alleiupLed tu uen

+l

** -

e

. ^eix uuiiuuUiia ana complaint.

' Since the *:.i T t- this app* .
filed, Defendant has
noticed that both the Return on Pi
-;erved (R 10) and the
Affidavit of Deputy Jack Hill in w n i c n^ ^escribes his attempts
to personally serve process (R 64) contain the wrong case number.
They refer to a case number 94001658f rather than to this case.
Since neither of these documents gives the names of any of the
parties to the case, and since the Affidavit refers to an
"annexed summons, complaint" which are not actually annexed,
Defendant now questions whether Deputy Jack Hill attempted to
serve the correct summons and complaint, or attempted to serve
the summons and complaint from case number 94001658. If this
Court is inclined to consider inconsistencies in the record which
were not presented to the trial court, Defendant requests that
this issue also be considered.
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First,

there

was

the

correct

address

of

Defendant's

residence: "6270 S. Margray Drive, West Jordan, Utah 84084."
This was the first address used by Plaintiffs' counsel in his
letter of November 18, 1993. It was also apparently the address
supplied by Plaintiffs' counsel to the Salt Lake County Sheriff
for service of process, since the deputy stated that he attempted
service of process there.

But Plaintiff failed to inform the

trial court of this address and failed to mail the summons and
complaint to it.
Second,

there was

the

address

on

the

envelope which

Defendant used to reply to counsel's November 18 letter: "Airport
Motel, 6270 S. 2005 W., West Jordan, Utah 84084."

Plaintiffs did

not send copies of the summons and complaint to this address
either.

Although this address uses the street coordinate, 2005

W., rather than the street name, Margray Drive, it is virtually
the same as the first address and any mail sent to this second
address would likely have been received by Defendant.
The third address was the address appearing in the recorded
quit claim deed: "c/o Horace Knowlton, General Delivery, 1760 W.
2100 S., Salt Lake City, Utah 84111."

For reasons known only to

Plaintiffs or their counsel, this is the only address to which
they mailed copies of the summons and complaint.

Furthermore,

Plaintiffs omitted the words "c/o Horace Knowlton," presumably
because Plaintiffs' counsel knew that Horace Knowlton was dead.
Thus, of the three addresses available to Plaintiffs, they chose
the one in care of a dead man at the general post office for Salt
-4-

Lake City, and they omitted the name of the dead man.

It is

absurd to argue that this meets the diligence requirements of
Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987).4
Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the general delivery
address appeared on the quit claim deed recorded by Defendant in
1993.

But this quit claim deed was typed and signed in 1960.

There is no evidence as to when the general delivery address was
written on the deed.

It may have been written in I960, in 1993,

or sometime in between.

It seems likely that the address was

written while Horace Knowlton was still alive, perhaps years
before the date of recording.
Plaintiffs also make much of the fact that the general
delivery address appears in the Davis County Treasurer's records.
But

it

is common

knowledge

that

county

treasurers

obtain

addresses for tax notices from recorded deeds. Defendant did not
"give" this address to the county treasurer, as Plaintiffs claim.
Defendant simply recorded the quit claim deed with this address
on it and the county treasurer copied the address from the deed.
Plaintiffs point out that the relief given by the trial
court was in rem relief only. This does not, however, affect the
diligence required
process.

in using alternate

forms of service of

In Carlson v. Bos, supra, the Utah Supreme Court

expressly repudiated the notion that the validity of an alternate

4

See detailed discussion of Carlson v. Bos on pages 13 and
14 of Defendant's initial Brief.
-5-

form of notice depends on whether a case is in rem or in personam;
[W]e must and do disavow Graham to the extent that it
bases the form of notice required by the federal
constitution on whether the action is labeled in rem or
in personam. 740 P.2d at 1271. (See also footnote 5
on same page.)
This is not a case where Plaintiffs had to make a difficult
search to find an address for Defendant.

All they had to do was

use the addresses already in their possession.
a

few dollars, they

addresses.

could

have

sent

notice

For the cost of
to all three

Instead, they chose just one, and, intentionally or

not, they chose the one that was insufficient and the least
likely to reach Defendant.

In short, although diligent efforts

may have been made to personally serve process, Plaintiffs were
not diligent in their efforts to notify Defendant by publication
and mailing.
III. Since the Service of Process on Defendant was Fatally
Defective, Defendant is not Required to Show a Meritorious
Defense in Order to Have the Default Judgment Set Aside.
As explained above and in Defendant's initial Brief, the
service of process in this case fails to comply with the
requirements of Carlson v. Bos and Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

Because the service of

process on Defendant was fatally defective, the judgment entered
against him is void and there is no requirement that he show that
he has a meritorious defense in order to have it set aside.

-6-

In Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288f 290 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court quoted with approval the following from Wright and
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2862:
Rule 60(b)(4) [the equivalent to Utah Rule
60(b)(5)] authorizes relief from void judgments.
Necessarily a motion under this part of the rule
differs markedly from motions under the other clauses
of Rule 60(b). There is no question of discretion on
the part of the court when a motion is under Rule
60(b)(4).
Nor is there any requirement, as there
usually is when default judgments are attacked under
Rule 60(b) , that the moving party show that he has a
meritorious defense. 712 P.2d at 290 (emphasis added.)
IV.

If a Meritorious Defense is Required, Defendant's Affidavit
Presents One.
If service of process was not fatally defective, so that

Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment does not
come under clause (5) of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, then there may be a requirement that Defendant present
a meritorious defense.5 An examination of Mr. Romero's Affidavit
(included in Addendum 2 to Defendant's initial Brief) shows that

5

In Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
Usually, it is not appropriate on Rule 60(b) motions to
examine the merits of the claim decided by the default
judgment. 684 P.2d at 55.
Defendant acknowledges, however, that while this language in
Larsen has never been explained or disavowed, other cases decided
by the Utah Supreme Court appear to require a party seeking
relief from a default judgment to show a meritorious defense.
See, e.g.. State ex rel. Department of Social Services v.
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983); Erickson v. Schenkers
Intern. Forwarders. 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994).
-7-

it contains all of the elements necessary to establish a complete
defense.6
A.

A Meritorious Defense can be Presented by Affidavit.

The

fact

Counterclaim

that

Defendant

did

not

file

an

Answer

or

does not mean that no defense was presented.

Plaintiffs have cited no authority holding that a defense cannot
be presented by Affidavit. Rule 60(b) does not require an Answer
or Counterclaim — it refers only to a "motion" to set aside a
judgment.
In Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 376 P.2d 951 (Utah
1962), the Utah Supreme Court set aside a default judgment based
on defenses presented by affidavit only:
Defense attorneys immediately on that date prepared and
filed motions to set aside the default judgments. The
motions were later, by permission of the court,
supplemented by affidavits setting out the above facts
and claiming meritorious defenses. We are persuaded
that those facts show excusable neglect by the parties
desiring to defend these actions and that they moved
with dispatch to have the defaults set aside. 376 P.2d
at 953 (emphasis added.)
B.

It

was

not

Necessary

for

Defendant

to

File

a

Counterclaim Demanding Foreclosure in Order to Defend Against
Plaintiffs' Quiet Title Claim.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant's only meritorious defense
"would be a valid counterclaim upon the 1960 note, to be

6

Plaintiffs7 Brief addresses only one issue relating to
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure — whether or not
Defendant presented a meritorious defense. Plaintiffs apparently
do not dispute that Defendant has met the other requirements of
Rule 60(b).
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foreclosed based upon the 1960 deed..."7

This is incorrect.

In

their complaintf Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendant has
no lien or interest in the subject real property.8

In order to

defend against this claim, Defendant need only show that he holds
a valid lien.

If Defendant shows this, the relief requested by

Plaintiffs must be denied.

Defendant does not have to foreclose

his lien just because Plaintiffs have brought a quiet title
action against him.
C.
Against

Defendant's Affidavit Adequately Alleges a Debt, a Lien
the Subject

Property

Securing the Debt, and Facts

Avoiding the Statute of Limitations.
In his Affidavit, Mr. Romero states that he sold the
property which is the subject of this action to Plaintiffs for
$6,000.00 and that the purchase price for the property was paid
by delivery of a promissory note.9

He also states that the

promissory note was secured by a deed of trust. The quit claim
deed

covering

the

subject

"additional security."10

property

was

given

to

him

as

Several paragraphs of the Affidavit make

it abundantly clear that Mr. Romero maintains that the promissory
note has not been paid in full:

7

Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, p. 21.

8

Complaint, p. 3.
Affidavit of Lester Romero, Us 5, 6.

9
10

Affidavit of Lester Romero, I 6. Defendant does not
dispute Plaintiffs7 claim that the quit claim deed should be
deemed to be a mortgage rather than an absolute conveyance. Even
so, it is valid lien or interest which precludes entry of
judgment quieting title in Plaintiffs as prayed in the Complaint.
-9-

7.
The plaintiffs did not make all the payments
required by the promissory note in a timely fashion and
I had to constantly work with them to get the required
payments.
10. There have been disagreements between me and
the plaintiffs on the amount still due on the
promissory note for several years.
11. Not being able to convince the plaintiffs to
make the payments still due, I recorded the quit claim
deed on May 24, 1993.
15. In response to Mr. Fadel's letter, I sent a
lengthy reply indicating that the plaintiffs had not
paid the promissory note off and that I recorded the
quit claim deed pursuant to the agreement I had with
the plaintiffs that I would do so if they did not
pay....
Defendant's Affidavit also sets forth facts which preclude
Plaintiffs from relying on the statute of limitations.

In

paragraph 8 of his Affidavit, Mr. Romero states: "At no time did
I allow more than three (3) years to go by without receiving a
payment from the plaintiffs."

Plaintiffs complain that this

statement is ambiguous but it is actually quite clear.

It means

that there was at least one payment made during the first threeyear period after execution of the promissory note, at least one
payment made during the second three-year period, and so forth
until the latest three-year period.

There was never any three-

year period after the execution of the promissory note in which
no

payment

was

made.

Plaintiffs

wonder

"what

action

he

[Defendant] had ever taken if a payment had not been made within
three years."11 According to Mr. Romero's Affidavit, Plaintiffs'
question is misdirected.

Mr. Romero states that he constantly

Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, p. 22.
-10-

worked with Plaintiffs and the event contemplated by Plaintiffs'
question never occurred.
Section 78-12-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ("Utah Code")
provides:
In any case founded on contract, when any part of
the principal or interest shall have been paid, or an
acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim,
or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made,
an action may be brought within the period prescribed
for the same after such payment, acknowledgment or
promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in
writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby.
When a right of action is barred by the provisions of
any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause
of action or ground of defense.
This case clearly comes within the parameters of section 7812-44.

Defendant's note, deed of trust, and quit claim deed are

written contracts which would ordinarily be subject to a six-year
limitation period.12

Under section 78-12-44, the six-year period

was renewed each time a payment was made to Defendant.13
Mr. Romero does not state exactly when the last payment was
made

under

his

secured

promissory

note, but

according

to

paragraph 8 of his Affidavit, it had to be within three years of
September 6, 1994, the date of the Affidavit.

Accordingly, Mr.

Romero's note, trust deed and quit claim deed will not be barred
by the statute of limitations until at least September 6, 1997,
six years after the latest payment.
12

Utah Code § 78-12-23; Cromoton v. Jenson, 1 P.2d 242 (Utah

1931).
13

See also, Crompton v. Jenson, 1 P.2d 242 (Utah 1931),
holding that a defendant who made payments on a note and mortgage
could not subsequently argue that they were barred by the statute
of limitations.
-11-

V.

Defendant is Entitled to Have his Alleged Defenses Tried.
Defendant's Affidavit sets up contested issues of fact which

Defendant is entitled to have tried.

Plaintiffs claim that

Defendant's note and trust deed were paid in full in 1980.
Defendant counters that the note and trust deed have not been
paid in full and there are sums still owing.
that they

have made

no payments

Plaintiffs claim

on the note

since 1980.

Defendant counters that he has never allowed more than three
years to pass without receiving at least one payment on the note.
If Defendant's allegations are truef Plaintiffs are not entitled
to judgment.
In Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders, Inc., 882
P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court describes the
showing a defendant must make in order to establish a meritorious
defense under Rule 60(b).

A defendant does not have to set forth

specific facts showing his meritorious defense.14

A defendant

need only "proffer some defense of at least sufficient ostensible
merit as would justify a trial of the issue thus raised."15

The

defenses which the Erickson court relied upon to overturn the
default judgment consisted only of general denials of allegations
contained in the complaint.

They were not as specific as the

defenses alleged in Mr. Romero's Affidavit.

14

Plaintiffs claim

See discussion at 882 P.2d 1148, rejecting this standard
which had previously been endorsed by two justices in State ex
rel. Department of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053
(Utah 1983) .
15

882 P.2d at 1149.
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that Defendant should have stated the date and amount of the last
payment in order to allege a meritorious defense.16

Plaintiffs'

position is clearly contrary to Erickson.
CONCLUSION
Defendant has met all of the requirements to have the
default judgment against him set aside under Rule 60(b).
filed a timely motion.

He has

He has shown that the judgment should be

set aside as a void judgment under clause (5) of Rule 60(b)
because of fatally defective service.

In the alternativef he has

shown that the judgment should be set aside under clauses (1),
(3),

(4) and/or (7) of Rule 60(b) and he has established a

meritorious defense to Plaintiffs7 claims.

Due to Plaintiffs7

lack of diligence in using an alternate form of service of
process, Defendant has been deprived of the opportunity to have
his defenses heard.

The default judgment against Defendant

should be vacated so that he can have his day in court.
DATED this

n^

day of May, 1995.
LUNDBERG & MEADERS

By

16

_^^LcJ^^^S^±c
Scott
Lun^berg
ott Lungberc
Attorneys for E^elfendant/
Appellant

Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, p. 22.
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